Bombay High Court Reiterates: Writ Petition Cannot Bypass DRT Remedy in SARFAESI Dispute
The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that a party cannot ordinarily invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court to bypass an efficacious statutory remedy available before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). In a recent judgment, the Division Bench declined to entertain a writ petition challenging a proposed sale of mortgaged property, holding that the petitioner had an effective remedy under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).
The ruling came in Ravijyot Finance and Leasing (P) Ltd. v. Unity Small Finance Bank Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 9570, decided on August 17, 2026, by Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat. The dispute concerned a bank’s proposed sale of the subject property pursuant to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act.
The petitioner approached the High Court seeking to prevent the bank from proceeding with the sale. Its case was substantially founded on provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, with the argument that insolvency proceedings concerning the individual had implications for the bank’s proposed action against the property.
The bank opposed the maintainability of the writ petition. It pointed out that the petitioner already had an alternative statutory remedy before the DRT and, significantly, had previously invoked that remedy by filing a securitisation application challenging an earlier sale notice. That proceeding was still pending before the Tribunal.
The High Court was not persuaded that the petitioner could use the IBC proceedings to circumvent the statutory mechanism created under the SARFAESI Act. The Bench observed that the petitioner was essentially a mortgagor attempting to avoid the statutory remedy available against measures taken by the secured creditor.
The Court therefore applied the established principle that where an effective and efficacious statutory remedy exists, the High Court should ordinarily exercise restraint in entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The principle is particularly well established in matters arising under the SARFAESI Act, where Parliament has provided a specialised mechanism for challenging measures taken by secured creditors.
While dismissing the petition, the Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned High Courts against routinely entertaining writ petitions where remedies under the SARFAESI Act and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act are available.
The Bombay High Court also took note of an important procedural aspect. The petitioner had not disclosed that the moratorium relied upon in its argument had not been extended by the National Company Law Tribunal. The fact emerged only after the respondent bank produced an NCLT order dated July 1, 2026.
The Bench treated this non-disclosure seriously. It reiterated that a litigant approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and disclose material facts. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of U.P., which emphasised that the writ remedy is equitable in nature and cannot be invoked by suppressing relevant facts.
The judgment is significant for borrowers, mortgagors and other persons involved in SARFAESI proceedings because it reinforces the importance of approaching the DRT at the appropriate stage rather than directly invoking Article 226. The ruling also demonstrates that attempting to reframe a dispute through IBC proceedings will not necessarily enable a litigant to avoid the statutory SARFAESI mechanism.
At the same time, the principle does not mean that the existence of an alternative remedy creates an absolute constitutional bar on writ jurisdiction. The Bombay High Court itself has recognised that the rule is one of judicial restraint, prudence and self-imposed limitation rather than an absolute prohibition. In exceptional circumstances, a High Court may still intervene under Article 226.
The recent decision therefore reinforces a more precise legal position: the availability of a statutory remedy before the DRT is a powerful reason for the High Court to decline writ jurisdiction, particularly in SARFAESI matters, but it does not completely extinguish the constitutional power of judicial review. The facts and circumstances of each case remain relevant.
The Bombay High Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition, along with pending applications, leaving the petitioner to pursue the remedy available under the SARFAESI framework.
