When Accused Is in Jail, Court and Prosecution Have Duty to Expedite Trial: Supreme Court
Reiterating the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial, the Supreme Court has held that when an accused is in judicial custody, both the trial court and the prosecuting agency have a corresponding duty to ensure that the criminal trial proceeds expeditiously. The Court made the observation while granting bail to an undertrial prisoner who had remained incarcerated for more than nine years without the trial reaching completion, describing the prolonged delay as one that had “shocked our judicial conscience.”
A Bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Prasanna B. Varale was hearing the case of Liakat Ali v. State of Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioner had spent over nine years and two months in custody while facing charges including murder. Despite the passage of several years, only 12 out of the 30 prosecution witnesses had been examined, leaving the trial far from conclusion. The Court observed that such prolonged incarceration, without any fault attributable to the accused, was inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of a fair and speedy trial.
The Supreme Court categorically observed that “when the accused is under incarceration, it is incumbent upon the Court and the prosecuting agency to expedite the conduct of the trial.” Stressing that the responsibility does not rest solely with the accused to seek early hearings, the Bench said the justice delivery system itself must ensure that criminal proceedings involving incarcerated persons are conducted with urgency and efficiency.
Invoking its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court granted bail after concluding that the extraordinary delay had infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21. While the State argued that the petitioner should have first approached the appropriate court with a fresh bail application, the Bench held that the exceptional facts justified direct constitutional intervention by the Supreme Court.
The judgment also reiterates a principle consistently recognised in recent Supreme Court decisions—that the seriousness of the alleged offence cannot, by itself, justify indefinite pre-trial incarceration where there is no realistic prospect of the trial concluding within a reasonable period. The Court reaffirmed that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21, and prolonged delays require courts to seriously consider granting bail, irrespective of the gravity of the charges.
The Bench further noted that the prosecution case was based primarily on circumstantial evidence and that, at the prevailing pace of proceedings, the trial was likely to continue for a considerable period. In these circumstances, continued detention would amount to an unjustified deprivation of personal liberty, particularly when the accused continued to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
The ruling adds to a growing line of Supreme Court decisions expressing concern over delays in criminal trials. In recent hearings, the Court has repeatedly criticised investigating agencies and State governments for vigorously opposing bail applications while failing to ensure timely prosecution. The Court has warned that if the State seeks continued custody of an accused, it must discharge its corresponding obligation to conduct the trial without undue delay.
Legal experts believe the decision reinforces an important constitutional principle: pre-trial detention cannot become a substitute for punishment. The judgment serves as a reminder that the criminal justice system must balance the interests of society, victims, and the accused by ensuring that trials are conducted promptly. Where an accused remains in jail for years because of systemic delays rather than any conduct on their part, courts are constitutionally obliged to protect the right to personal liberty and consider appropriate relief, including bail.
